J4 ›› 2011, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 457-463.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

委托代理理论的物流公司装卸工人激励机制

冯文财, 徐庆, 夏青   

  1. 青岛大学 |国际商学院|山东 青岛 266071
  • 出版日期:2011-09-24 发布日期:2011-11-29
  • 作者简介:冯文财(1987—)|男|山东泰安人|青岛大学硕士研究生|主要从事供应链协调理论与应用、委托代理问题一阶有效性算法优化研究|(Tel)86-15264267373(E-mail)fwencai@163.com; 徐庆(1962—)|男|河南开封人|青岛大学教授|硕士生导师|主要从事供应链协调理论与应用、委托代理问题一阶有效性算法优化研究|(Tel)86-532-88636489(E-mail)xuqing618@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971070);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2009HM004)

Principal-Agent Theory of Logistics Companies Handling Workers'Incentives

FENG Wen-cai, XU Qing|XIA Qing   

  1. College of International Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
  • Online:2011-09-24 Published:2011-11-29

摘要:

针对物流企业最重要的人力资源——一线员工的激励研究相对较少,且缺少定量研究问题,笔者运用多委托代理模型,分析了物流企业中存在的两类一线员工,即物流公司各地网点的装卸工人及物流公司中转仓库网点的装卸工人的激励问题,并提出了具体的激励措施。研究结果对物流企业实施具体的激励措施有一定的借鉴作用。

关键词: 物流, 装卸工人, 激励, 委托代理

Abstract:

For the logistics company's most important human resource-front-line employees incentives for research is relatively small, and the lack of quantitative research.We use multiple principal-agent model to analyze the logistics enterprises there are two types of front-line employees, that is around the network of logistics companies and logistics companies handling workers, transit workers, warehouse outlets handling the incentive problem and come to specific incentives. The results of the logistics enterprises to implement specific incentives have some reference.

Key words: logistics, loader, incentive, principle-agent

中图分类号: 

  • TP301.6