智能网联公交车出站强制换道的演化博弈机制

doi:10.13229/j.cnki.jdxbgxb.20220207

Abstract

Abstract:

To relieve the conflicts between the intelligent connected bus and the social vehicle in the mandatory lane changing for bus exiting， the evolutionary game mechanisms for their behavioral decision-makings are analyzed. Two scenarios where the social vehicles are human-driven and intelligent connected are considered. The utility functions in different strategy profiles of the evolutionary game are formulated from the perspectives of safety utility， time utility and energy-saving utility. On this basis， the replicator dynamics equations for the two scenarios are constructed. According to the determinant and trace of Jacobi matrix in the dynamic game system， the equilibrium points and their stability in different situations are analyzed deeply. The sensitivity of evolutionary results to the difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies is explored. The results reveal that： the possible evolutionary directions in the dynamic game system involve “intelligent connected buses changing lanes， and social vehicles giving way”， “intelligent connected buses not changing lanes， and social vehicles not giving way”， and “intelligent connected buses not changing lanes， and social vehicles giving way”. From the perspective of overall optimization， adjusting the relevant variables of the safety and time utility of social vehicles can ensure the safety and efficiency of more vehicles in the process of mandatory lane changing of intelligent connected bus. The energy-saving utility promotes the strategy profile of changing lanes and giving way， and inhibits the strategy profile of not changing lanes and not giving way.

Key words: traffic engineering, intelligent connected bus, mandatory lane changing, evolutionary game, behavioral decision-making

CLC Number:

U121

Xiao-jing DU,Rong-han YAO. Evolutionary game mechanism of mandatory lane changing for exiting for intelligent connected bus[J].Journal of Jilin University(Engineering and Technology Edition), 2024, 54(1): 124-135.

Figures/Tables 13

Fig.1

Fig.2

Table 1

Utility matrix of the game in Scenario 1"

策略	让路	不让路
换道	$u B T - 11 +$ ， $u V S - 11 +$	$u B S - 12 -$ ， $u V S - 12 -$
不换道	$u B S - 21 + + u B T - 21 -$ ， $u V S - 21 + + u V T - 21 -$	$u B S - 22 +$ ， $u V T - 22 +$

Table 1

Table 2

Utility matrix of the game in Scenario 2"

策略	让路	不让路
换道	$u B T - 11 +$ ， $u V S - 11 + + u V E - 11 +$	$u B S - 12 -$ ， $u V S - 12 -$
不换道	$u B S - 21 + + u B T - 21 -$ ， $u V S - 21 + + u V T - 21 - + u V E - 21 +$	$u B S - 22 +$ ， $u V T - 22 +$

Table 2

Table 3

Determinant and trace of Jacobi matrix corresponding to every equilibrium point"

均衡点	行列式	迹
（0，0）	$- Δ B 2 ? Δ S 2$	$- Δ B 2 + Δ S 2$
（0，1）	$Δ B 1 ? Δ S 2$	$- Δ B 1 - Δ S 2$
（1，0）	$Δ B 2 ? Δ S 1$	$Δ B 2 + Δ S 1$
（1，1）	$- Δ B 1 ? Δ S 1$	$Δ B 1 - Δ S 1$
$Δ S 2 / Δ S 2 - Δ S 1, Δ B 2 / Δ B 2 - Δ B 1$	$Δ B 1 ? Δ B 2 ? Δ S 1 ? Δ S 2 (Δ B 1 - Δ B 2) ? (Δ S 1 - Δ S 2)$	0

Table 3

Table 4

Analysis of stable states of equilibrium points"

均衡点	情形1	情形2	情形3	情形4
（0，0）	鞍点	稳定点	鞍点	稳定点
（0，1）	稳定点	鞍点	鞍点	不稳定点
（1，0）	不稳定点	不稳定点	不稳定点	不稳定点
（1，1）	鞍点	鞍点	稳定点	稳定点
$Δ S 2 / Δ S 2 - Δ S 1, Δ B 2 / Δ B 2 - Δ B 1$	-	-	-	纳什均衡点

Table 4

Table 5

Statistical results of different kinds of utilities"

效用	物理量	平均值	最大值	最小值	归一化值
安全效用/（m·s^-2）	$u B S - 12 -$	-1.52	-0.01	-3.08	-0.49
	$u B S - 2 j +$	1.44	3.36	0.02	0.42
	$u V S - i 1 +$	0.61	1.91	0.01	0.32
	$u V S - 12 -$	-0.82	-0.01	-3.53	-0.23
时间效用/s	$u B T - 11 +$	664.75	1190.00	234.50	0.45
	$u B T - 21 -$	-778.10	-448.90	-1504.80	-0.31
	$u V T - 21 -$	-4.07	-2.30	-9.70	-0.24
	$u V T - 22 +$	3.42	7.10	1.50	0.34
节能收益/［kg·（100 km）^-1］	$u V E - i 1 +$	7.44	93.00	4.70	0.03

Table 5

Fig.3

Fig.4

Fig.5

Fig.6

Fig.7

Fig.8

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